



Registration needed at <https://forms.gle/kFrP6Ye7tYbuW95T8> (free).

### Speakers:

**Dan Zahavi** | Director and Professor of the Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen

**Carlos Morujão** | Full Professor of the Centre for Philosophical and Humanistic Studies (FCH-UCP), Portuguese Catholic University

**Gloria Andrada** | Research Fellow of the Lisbon Mind & Reasoning Group, IFILNOVA, NOVA University of Lisbon

**Steven S. Gouveia** | Research Fellow of the Mind, Language & Action Group, University of Porto

**Bruno Nobre (Host)** | Professor of the Centre for Philosophical and Humanistic Studies (FFCS-UCP), Portuguese Catholic University

## Programme

### 14.30h | Opening session

#### 14.40h | Dan Zahavi | *Dyads and triads: Simmel, Sartre and Tomasello (45')*

In recent work, Tomasello has introduced a distinction between two forms of shared intentionality. Tomasello calls the first form joint intentionality and also refers to it as second-personal joint intentionality or as a we-intentionality with a particular other. The most significant characteristic of this type of shared intentionality is that it occurs in the here and now and involves interaction with a specific individual. The second form of shared intentionality, which Tomasello calls collective intentionality, refers to large scale forms of collaboration, that is, forms that go beyond the here and now and involve the construction of a common cultural ground (involving conventions, norms, and institutions) as well as in-group out-group differentiations. Tomasello's distinction is significant and can also be found in classical phenomenology, for instance in the work of Husserl and Walther. It is, however, one thing to recognize the shift from the dyadic to the group-based we and something else to understand how exactly that transition occurs. Drawing on the work of Simmel and Sartre, I will in my talk focus on something that remains somewhat underexplored in Tomasello (and Husserl and Walther), namely the role of the third.

#### 15.40h | Carlos Morujão | *Phenomenology in the XXI<sup>st</sup> Century (20')*

During a great part of the last century, Husserl's phenomenology was regarded as a particular variant of foundationalist philosophies, in the line of Cartesian solipsism. Martin Heidegger's interpretation of Husserl philosophy only reinforced this traditional way of looking at Husserl's work. Despite the original work of his followers and students (like, Ludwig Landgrebe, Eugen Fink, Aron Gurwitsch or Alfred Schutz) and, later, of phenomenologically oriented philosophers (like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in France, or Jan Patocka in the Czech republic), this image of Husserl was longstanding.

Portugal was no exception. In Spain, the original work of Ortega y Gasset developed some important Husserlian issues (like the philosophy of culture of the Freiburg period), but Ortega thought for a long time he was applying the phenomenological method to subjects alien to the founder of phenomenology. This situation changed radically from the 1980's onwards with the publication of very important manuscripts in the *Husserliana* series, that until then were only known by some Husserl's specialists. The Conferences on Fichte, the *Kaizo* articles, several manuscripts addressing the issues already familiar to the readers of the *Crisis* book, shaped what Robert Walton called "the new Husserl". Moreover, the volumes of *Husserliana* addressing such themes as the image consciousness, imagination and phantasy, embodiment and cognition, but also some limit-problems like birth, death or the meaning of existence, put phenomenology at the center of philosophical debates. In some philosophical fields, traditionally considered the exclusive domain of analytic philosophy – like Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Logic, or the Foundations of Mathematics – the presence of phenomenology is increasingly felt. Phenomenology also has shown that some debated issues are probably pseudo-philosophical problems that only arose due to an absence of analysis that has as the starting point "the things themselves". Taking into account this new philosophical scenario, I will try to sketch in my paper some recent developments of phenomenological philosophy in the first two decades of the XXIst century.

## **16.10h – 16.40h | Coffee-break**

### **16.40h | Gloria Andrada | *Developing a Feminist Consciousness: Some Reflections on Sandra Lee Bartky's Feminist Phenomenology* (20')**

Sandra Lee Bartky (1990) carefully articulates the profound experience of personal transformation that developing a feminist consciousness entails. Vindicating a situated and embodied phenomenology, Bartky tries to record what it is like to undergo such a transformation both in one's own self-understanding and in the understanding one has of their situation. In this presentation, I first bring forth and reflect on some of the ideas captured in Bartky's feminist phenomenology. Then, in an attempt to increase our understanding of what developing a feminist consciousness consists of, I connect Bartky's worthwhile and stimulating project with recent works on the enculturation of human cognition.

### **17.10h | Steven S. Gouveia | *Phenomenology and Neuroscience: a Methodological Examination* (20')**

The methodological problem of the relationship between philosophy and neuroscience is the problem of considering a possible interaction between these two dissimilar disciplines. Phenomenology is the philosophical method of investigating everyday experience and is focused on the analysis of different phenomena (from the Greek *phainomemon*, "what is shown") and how they appear to consciousness, i.e., from a first-person perspective. Thus, phenomenology is a particularly useful discipline for understanding how phenomena appear to our minds, and how we give them meaning. Neuroscience is the scientific study of the brain and nervous system, which deals with the cerebral aspects from a third-person perspective. Many philosophers believe that neither a first-person perspective nor a third-person perspective can be sufficient to solve or dissolve particular problems of the philosophy of the mind. Rather, they believe that, in some way, it is necessary to join these two tools that seem, by definition, irreconcilable, in a working methodology that offers explanatory advantages over its competitors. However, due to ontological and methodological disagreements between phenomenology and neuroscience, the dialogue between the two disciplines is quite controversial and Neurophenomenology appears exactly as an attempt to reconcile these two perspectives. The goal of the talk is to present a critical overview of this approach.

## **17.40h – 18.00h | General Discussion**